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Abstract
Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private.
In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players’
utility functions (and doing so has been shown to lead to non-truthfulness in some cases). In this work,
we propose a new, general way of modelling privacy in players’ utility functions. Specifically, we
only assume that if an outcome o has the property that any report of player i would have led to o with
approximately the same probability, then o has small privacy cost to player i. We give three mechanisms
that are truthful with respect to our modelling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a
discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social choice problem with discrete
utilities (via a VCG-like mechanism). As the number n of players increases, the social welfare achieved
by our mechanisms approaches optimal (as a fraction of n).
Keywords: differential privacy, mechanism design, truthfulness, elections, VCG
∗Work begun when all the authors were at the Harvard Center for Computation and Society, supported in part by a gift from
Google, Inc. and by NSF Grant CCF-0915016.
†Center for Research on Computation and Society and School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 33
Oxford Street, Cambridge, MA. E-mail: yiling@seas.harvard.edu.
‡Center for Research on Computation and Society and School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 33
Oxford Street, Cambridge, MA. E-mail: chong@seas.harvard.edu. Supported by NSF Grant No. 1054172.
§Microsoft Research Cambridge, 7 J J Thomson Ave, Cambridge CB3 0FB, UK. E-mail: iankash@microsoft.com.
¶Efi Arazi School of Computer Science, IDC Herzliya. Email: talm@idc.ac.il.
‖Center for Research on Computation and Society and School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 33
Oxford Street, Cambridge, MA. E-mail: salil@seas.harvard.edu
1 Introduction
In this paper, we examine the interaction between mechanism design and differential privacy. In particular,
we explicitly model privacy in players’ utility functions and design truthful mechanisms with respect to it.
Our work is motivated by considerations in both fields.
In mechanism design, it has long been recognized that players may not behave as predicted due to tradi-
tional incentives analysis out of concerns for privacy: in addition to having preferences about the outcome
of a mechanism (e.g., who wins an auction, or where a hospital is located), they may also be concerned
about what others learn about their private information (e.g., how much they value the auctioned good, or
whether they have some medical condition that makes them care more about the hospital’s location). The
latter concerns are not modelled in most works on mechanism design, and it is natural to try to bring the
new models and techniques of differential privacy to bear on them.
Differential privacy [6] is a notion developed to capture privacy when performing statistical analyses
of databases. Informally, a randomized algorithm is differentially private if changing a single individual’s
data does not “substantially” change the output distribution of the algorithm. Thus, differential privacy
is not an absolute notion, but rather a quantitative one that needs to be weighed against other objectives.
Indeed, differentially private algorithms typically offer a tradeoff between the level of privacy offered to
individuals in a database and the accuracy of statistics computed on the database, which we can think of as a
“global” objective to be optimized. However, it is also of interest to consider how privacy should be weighed
against the objectives of the individuals themselves. Mechanism design provides a natural setting in which
to consider such tradeoffs. Attempting to model and reason about privacy in the context of mechanism
design seems likely to lead to an improved understanding about the meaning and value of privacy.
1.1 Previous Work
The first work bringing together differential privacy and mechanism design was by McSherry and Tal-
war [14]. They showed how to use differential privacy as a tool for mechanism design. By definition, differ-
entially private algorithms are insensitive to individuals’ inputs; a change in a single individual’s input has
only a small effect on the output distribution of the algorithm. Thus, if a mechanism is differentially private
(and players have bounded utility functions), it immediately follows that the mechanism is approximately
truthful. That is, reporting untruthfully can only provide a small gain in a player’s utility. With this observa-
tion, McSherry and Talwar showed how tools from differential privacy allow construction of approximately
truthful mechanisms for many problems, including ones where exact truthfulness is impossible.
However, as pointed out by Nissim, Smorodinsky, and Tennenholz [17], the approximate truthfulness
achieved by McSherry and Talwar [14] may not be a satisfactory solution concept. While differential privacy
can guarantee that a player will gain arbitrarily little by lying, it also makes the potential gain from telling
the truth equally small. Thus players may choose to lie in order to protect their privacy. Even worse, as
shown by an example in Nissim et al. [17], in some cases misreporting is a dominant strategy of the game.
Thus, it is difficult to predict the outcome and “global” objectives such as social welfare of differentially
private mechanisms. Motivated by this, Nissim et al. [17] show how to modify some of the mechanisms of
McSherry and Talwar [14] to provide exact truthfulness. In doing so, they sacrifice differential privacy.
A recent paper by Xiao [19] shows how to remedy this deficiency and construct mechanisms that si-
multaneously achieve exact truthfulness and differential privacy. Xiao’s paper also points out that even this
combination may not be sufficient for getting players that value privacy to report truthfully. Indeed, exact
truthfulness only means that a player weakly prefers to tell the truth. Lying might not reduce the player’s
utility at all (and differential privacy implies that it can only reduce the player’s utility by at most a small
amount). On the other hand, differential privacy does not guarantee “perfect” privacy protection, so it is
possible that a player’s concern for privacy may still outweigh the small or zero benefit from being truthful.
To address this, Xiao [19] advocated incorporating privacy directly into the players’ utility functions,
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and seeking mechanisms that are truthful when taking the combined utilities into account. He proposed to
measure privacy cost as the the mutual information between a player’s type (assumed to come from some
prior distribution) and the outcome of the mechanism.1 Using this measure, he showed that his mechanism
does not remain truthful when incorporating privacy into the utility functions, and left as an open problem
to construct mechanisms that do.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper, we propose a new, more general way of modelling privacy in players’ utility functions. Unlike
Xiao’s mutual information measure, our model does not require assuming a prior on players’ types, and
is instead a pointwise model: we simply assume that if an outcome o has the property that any report of
player i would have led to o with approximately the same probability, then o has small privacy cost to
player i. One motivation for this assumption is that such an outcome o will induce only a small change in a
Bayesian adversary’s beliefs about player i (conditioned on the other players’ reports). (This is inspired by
a Bayesian interpretation of differential privacy, due to Dwork and McSherry and described in [13].) While
Xiao’s mutual information measure is not strictly a special case of our model, we show (in the appendix)
that truthfulness with respect to our modelling implies truthfulness with respect to Xiao’s.
We give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to our model of privacy: one for an election
between two candidates, one for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and one for general
social choice problems with discrete utilities (via a VCG-like mechanism). As the number n of players
increases, the social welfare achieved by our mechanisms approaches optimal (as a fraction of n).
Our mechanisms are inspired by Xiao’s mechanisms, but with some variations and new analyses to
obtain truthfulness when taking privacy into account. For the election and facility location mechanisms, we
can establish universal truthfulness—truthfulness for every choice of the mechanism’s random coins. For
our VCG-like mechanism for general social choice problems, we need to work a bit harder to also ensure
that the payments requested do not compromise privacy, and this leads us to only achieve truthfulness in
expectation. In a nutshell, our proofs of universal truthfulness consider two cases for every fixing of the
player’s reports and coin tosses of the mechanism: If a player misreporting does not affect the outcome
of the mechanism, then that player is completely indifferent between truth-telling and misreporting, even
taking privacy into account. On the other hand, if the player misreporting does change the outcome of the
mechanism, then being truthful provides a noticeable gain in utility (for the mechanisms we consider) while
differential privacy ensures that the privacy cost of the outcome is still small. Thus, this analysis allows us
to argue that the benefit of truthfulness outweighs privacy cost even when a player has a tiny probability of
affecting the outcome (e.g., in a highly skewed election using a majority vote with random noise). Indeed,
our key observation is that the expected privacy cost is also tiny in such case.
Unlike previous works, we do not treat differential privacy as an end in itself but rather as a means
to incentivize truthfulness from agents that value privacy. Thus, we do not necessarily need to set the
differential privacy parameter ǫ to be very small (corresponding to very high privacy, but a larger price in
social welfare); we only need to set it small enough so that the privacy costs are outweighed by the agents’
preferences for outcomes. Specifically, our analysis shows that as we decrease ǫ, agents’ ability to affect
the outcome falls, but their expected privacy cost falls even faster. Thus, it is natural to conclude (as we do)
that there is some value of ǫ (which may be large if the agents care much more about the outcome than their
privacy) at which the privacy cost is small enough relative to the benefit that agents are willing to report
truthfully. Moreover, by taking agents’ value for privacy into account in the incentives analysis, we can
have greater confidence that the agents will actually report truthfully and achieve the approximately optimal
social welfare our analysis predicts.
1Subsequent to our work, Xiao has revised his model to use a different, prior-free measure of privacy.
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1.3 Other Related Work
Independently of our work, Nissim, Orlandi, and Smorodinsky [16] have considered a related way of mod-
elling privacy in players’ utilities and constructed truthful mechanisms under their model. They assume
that if all outcomes o have the property that no player’s report affects the probability of o much (i.e., the
mechanism is differentially private), then the overall privacy cost of the mechanism is small for every player.
This is weaker than our assumption, which requires an analogous bound on the privacy cost for each specific
outcome o. Indeed, Nissim et al. [16] do not consider a per-outcome model of privacy, and thus do not ob-
tain a reduced privacy cost when a player has a very low probability of affecting the outcome (e.g., a highly
skewed election). However, they require assumptions that give the mechanism an ability to reward players
for truthfulness (through their concept of “agents’ reactions,” which can be restricted by the mechanism).
For example, in the case of an election or poll between two choices (also considered in their paper), they
require that a player directly benefits from reporting their true choice (e.g., in a poll to determine which of
two magazines is more popular, a player will receive a copy of whichever magazine she votes for, providing
her with positive utility at no privacy cost), whereas we consider a more standard election where the players
only receive utility for their preferred candidate winning (minus any costs due to privacy). In general, we
consider the standard mechanism design setting where truthfulness is only rewarded through the public out-
come (and possibly payments), and this brings out the central tension that our mechanisms need to reconcile:
we can only incentivize truthfulness by giving players an influence on the outcome, but such an influence
also leads to privacy costs, which may incentivize lying.
Another recent paper that considers a combination of differential privacy and mechanism design is that
of Ghosh and Roth [10]. They consider a setting where each player has some private information and some
value for its privacy (measured in a way related to differential privacy). The goal is to design a mechanism
for a data analyst to compute a statistic of the players’ private information as accurately as possible, by
purchasing data from many players and then performing a differentially private computation. In their model,
players may lie about their value for privacy, but they cannot provide false data to the analyst. So they
design mechanisms that get players to truthfully report their value for privacy. In contrast, we consider
settings where players may lie about their data (their private types), but where they have a direct interest
in the outcome of the mechanism, which we use to outweigh their value for privacy (so we do not need to
explicitly elicit their value for privacy).
Subsequent to our work, Huang and Kannan [11] examined the properties of the exponential mecha-
nism [14], which can be thought of as noisy version of VCG that is slightly different from the one we study.
They showed that, with appropriate payments, this mechanism is truthful, individually rational, approxi-
mately efficient, and differentially private, but their model does not incorporate privacy costs into players’
utility functions.
We remark that there have also been a number of works that consider secure-computation-like notions
of privacy for mechanism design problems (see [15, 5, 12, 18, 2, 9] for some examples). In these works,
the goal is to ensure that a distributed implementation of a mechanism does not leak much more information
than a centralized implementation by a trusted third party In our setting, we assume we have a trusted third
party to implement the mechanism and are concerned with the information leaked by the outcome itself.
2 Background on Mechanism Design
In this section, we introduce the standard framework of mechanism design to lay the ground for modelling
privacy in the context of mechanism design in next section. We use a running example of an election between
two candidates. A (deterministic) mechanism is given by the following components:
• A number n of players. These might be the n voters in an election between two candidates A and B.
• A set Θ of player types. In the election example, we take Θ = {A, B}, where θi ∈ Θ indicates which of
the two candidates is preferred by voter i ∈ [n].
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• A set O of outcomes. In the election example, we take O = {A, B}, where the outcome indicates which
of the two candidates win. (Note that we do not include the tally of the vote as part of the outcome. This
turns out to be significant for privacy.)
• Players’ action spaces Xi for all i ∈ [n]. In general, a player’s action space can be different from his type
space. However, in this paper we view the types in Θ to be values that we expect players to know and
report. Hence, we require Xi = Θ for all i ∈ [n] (i.e., we restrict to direct revelation mechanisms, which
is without loss of generality). In the election example, the action of a player is to vote for A or for B.
• An outcome function M : X1 × · · · × Xn → O that determines an outcome given players’ actions. Since
we require Xi = Θ, the outcome function becomes M : Θn → O. For example, a majority voting
mechanism’s function maps votes of players to the candidate who received a majority of votes.
• Player-specific utility functions Ui : Θ × O → R for i = 1, . . . , n, giving the utility of player i as a
function of his type and the outcome.
To simplify notation, we use a mechanism’s outcome function to represent the mechanism. That is,
a mechanism is denoted M : Θn → O. The goal of mechanism design is then to design a mechanism
M : Θn → O that takes players’ (reported) types and selects an outcome so as to maximize some global
objective function (e.g. the sum of the players’ utilities, known as social welfare) even when players may
falsely report their type in order to increase their personal utility. The possibility of players’ misreporting is
typically handled by designing mechanisms that are incentive-compatible, i.e., it is in each player’s interest
to report their type honestly. A strong formulation of incentive compatibility is the notion of truthfulness
(a.k.a. dominant-strategy incentive compatibility): for all players i, all types θi ∈ Θ, all alternative reports
θ′i ∈ Θ, and all profiles θ−i of the other players’ reports2, we have:
Ui(θi,M(θi, θ−i)) ≥ Ui(θi,M(θ′i , θ−i)). (2.1)
If Inequality (2.1) holds for player i (but not necessarily all players), we say that the mechanism is truthful for
player i. Note that we are using θ−i here as both the type and the report of other players. Since truthfulness
must hold for all possible reports of other players, it is without loss of generality to assume that other players
report their true type. This is in contrast to the notion of a Nash equilibrium which refers to the incentives
of player i under the assumption that other players are using equilibrium strategies.
In the election example, it is easy to see that standard majority voting is a truthful mechanism. Changing
one’s vote to a less-preferred candidate can never increase one’s utility (it either does not affect the outcome,
or does so in a way that results in lower utility).
In this paper, we will allow randomized mechanisms, which we define as M : Θn × R → O, where R is
the probability space from which the mechanism makes its random choices (e.g., all possible sequences of
coin tosses used by the mechanism). We write M(θ) to denote the random variable obtained by sampling r
from R and evaluating M(θ; r). This (non-standard) definition of a randomized mechanism is equivalent to
the standard one (where the mechanism is a function from reported types to a distribution over outcomes)
and makes our analysis clearer.
For randomized mechanisms, one natural generalization of truthfulness is truthfulness in expectation:
for all players i, all types θi, all utility functions Ui, all reports θ′i , and all profiles θ−i of the other players’
reports, we have:
E[Ui(θi,M(θi, θ−i))] ≥ E[Ui(θi,M(θ′i , θ−i))],
where the expectation is taken over the random choices of the mechanism.
2We adopt the standard game-theory convention that θ−i refers to all components of the vector θ except the one corresponding
to player i, and that (θi, θ−i) denotes the vector obtained by putting θi in the i’th component and using θ−i for the rest.
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A stronger notion is that of universal truthfulness: for all players i, all types θi and utility functions Ui,
all alternative reports θ′i , and all profiles θ−i of the other players’ reports, and all r ∈ R, we have:
Ui(θi,M(θi, θ−i; r)) ≥ Ui(θi,M(θ′i , θ−i; r)).
Thus M being universally truthful is equivalent to saying that for every r ∈ R, M(·; r) is a deterministic
truthful mechanism.
3 Modelling Privacy in Mechanism Design
The standard framework of mechanism design does not consider a player’s value of privacy. In this section,
we incorporate privacy into mechanism design and adapt the definitions of truthfulness accordingly. We
continue considering the basic mechanism-design setting from Section 2. However, players now care not
only about the outcome of the mechanism, but also what that outcome reveals about their private types.
Thus, a player’s utility becomes
Ui = Uouti + U
priv
i , (3.1)
where Uouti : Θ × O → R is player i’s utility for the outcome and U
priv
i is player i’s utility associated with
privacy or information leakage. Before discussing the form of U priv (i.e., what are its inputs), we note that
in Equation (3.1), there is already an implicit assumption that privacy can be measured in units that can be
linearly traded with other forms of utility. A more general formulation would allow Ui to be an arbitrary
monotone function of Uouti and U
priv
i , but we make the standard quasi-linearity assumption for simplicity.
Now, we turn to functional form of U privi . First, we note that U
priv
i should not just be a function of player
i’s type and the outcome. What matters is the functional relationship between player i’s reported type and
the outcome. For example, a voting mechanism that ignores player i’s vote should have zero privacy cost to
player i, but one that uses player i’s vote to entirely determine the outcome may have a large privacy cost.
So we will allow U privi to depend on the mechanism itself, as well as the reports of other players, since these
are what determine the functional relationship between player i’s report and the outcome:
U privi : Θ × O × {M : Θn × R → O} × Θn−1 → R. (3.2)
Thus, when the reports of the n players are θ′ ∈ Θn and the outcome is o, the utility of player i is
Ui(θi, o,M, θ′−i) = Uouti (θi, o) + U privi (θi, o,M, θ′−i).
In particular, Ui has the same inputs as U priv above, including M. Unlike standard mechanism design,
we are not given fixed utility functions and then need to design a mechanism with respect to those utility
functions. Our choice of mechanism affects the utility functions too!
Note that we do not assume that U privi is always negative (in contrast to Xiao [19]). In some cases,
players may prefer for information about them to be kept secret and in other cases they may prefer for it to
be leaked (e.g., in case it is flattering). Thus, U privi may be better thought of as “informational utility” rather
than a “privacy cost”.
It is significant that we do not allow the U privi to depend on the report or, more generally, the strategy of
player i. This is again in contrast to Xiao’s modelling of privacy [19]. We will discuss the motivation for our
choice in Section 8, and also show that despite this difference, truthfulness with respect to our modelling
implies truthfulness with respect to Xiao’s modelling (Appendix A).
Clearly no mechanism design would be possible if we make no further assumptions about the U privi ’s
and allow them to be arbitrary, unknown functions (as their behavior could completely cancel the Uouti ’s).
Thus, we will make the natural assumption that U privi is small if player i’s report has little influence on the
outcome o. More precisely:
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Assumption 3.1 (privacy-value assumption).
∀θ ∈ Θn, o ∈ O,M :
∣∣∣∣U privi (θi, o,M, θ−i)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Fi
 max
θ′i ,θ
′′
i ∈Θ
Pr
[
M(θ′i , θ−i) = o
]
Pr
[
M(θ′′i , θ−i) = o
]
 ,
where Fi : [1,∞) → [0,∞] is a privacy-bound function with the property that Fi(x) → 0 as x → 1, and the
probabilities are taken over the random choices of M.
Note that if the mechanism ignores player i’s report, then the right-hand side of (3.1) is Fi(1), which
naturally corresponds to a privacy cost of 0. Thus, we are assuming that the privacy costs satisfy a continuity
condition as the mechanism’s dependence on player i’s report decreases. The privacy-bound function Fi
could be the same for all players, but we allow it to depend on the player for generality.
Assumption (3.1) is inspired by the notion of differential privacy, which is due to Dinur and Nissim [4],
Dwork and Nissim [7], Blum et al. [1], and Dwork et al. [6]. We restate it in our notation:
Definition 3.2. A mechanism M : Θn × R → O is ǫ-differentially private iff
∀θ−i ∈ Θn−1, o ∈ O max
θ′i ,θ
′′
i ∈Θ
Pr
[
M(θ′i , θ−i) = o
]
Pr
[
M(θ′′i , θ−i) = o
] ≤ eǫ .
By inspection of Assumption (3.1) and the definition of differential privacy, we have the following result.
Proposition 3.3. If M is ǫ-differentially private, then for all players i whose utility functions satisfy As-
sumption (3.1), all θ−i ∈ Θn−1, and o ∈ O, we have
∣∣∣∣U privi (θi, o,M, θ−i)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Fi(eǫ ).
In particular, as we take ǫ → 0, the privacy cost of any given outcome tends to 0.
Like differential privacy, Assumption (3.1) makes sense only for randomized mechanisms, and only
measures the loss in privacy contributed by Player i’s report when fixing the reports of the other players.
In some cases, it may be that the other players’ reports already reveal a lot of information about player i.
See Section 8 for further discussion, interpretation, and critiques of our modelling. With this model, the
definitions of truthfulness with privacy are direct analogues of the basic definitions given earlier.
Definition 3.4 (truthfulness with privacy). Consider a mechanism design problem with n players, type space
Θ, and outcome space O. For a player i with utility function Ui = Uouti + U
priv
i , we say that a randomized
mechanism M : Θn × R → O is truthful in expectation for player i if for all types θi ∈ Θi, all alternative
reports θ′i ∈ Θ for player i, and all possible profiles θ−i of the other players’ reports, we have:
E[Ui(θi,M(θi, θ−i),M, θ−i)] ≥ E[Ui(θi,M(θ′i , θ−i),M, θ−i)].
We say that M is universally truthful for player i if the inequality further holds for all values of r ∈ R:
Ui(θi,M(θi, θ−i; r),M, θ−i) ≥ Ui(θi,M(θ′i , θ−i; r),M, θ−i).
Note that, unlike in standard settings, M being universally truthful does not mean that the deterministic
mechanisms M(·; r) are truthful. Indeed, even when we fix r, the privacy utility U privi (θ, o,M, θ−i) still
depends on the original randomized function M, and the privacy properties of M would be lost if we
publicly revealed r. What universal truthfulness means is that player i would still want to report truthfully
even if she knew r but it were kept secret from the rest of the world.
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4 Private Two-Candidate Elections
Using Proposition 3.3, we will sometimes be able to obtain truthful mechanisms taking privacy into account
by applying tools from differential privacy to mechanisms that are already truthful when ignoring privacy.
In this section, we give an illustration of this approach in our example of a two-candidate election.
Mechanism 4.1. Differentially private election mechanism
Input: profile θ ∈ {A, B}n of votes, privacy parameter ǫ > 0.
1. Choose r ∈ Z from a discrete Laplace distribution, namely Pr[r = k] ∝ exp(−ǫ|k|).
2. If #{i : θi = A} − #{i : θi = B} ≥ r, output A. Otherwise output B.
We show that for sufficiently small ǫ, this mechanism is truthful for players satisfying Assumption 3.1:
Theorem 4.2. Mechanism 4.1 is universally truthful for player i provided that, for some function Fi:
1. Player i’s privacy utility U privi satisfies Assumption 3.1 with privacy bound function Fi, and
2. Uouti (θi, θi) − Uouti (θi,¬θi) ≥ 2Fi(eǫ ),
Note that Condition 2 holds for sufficiently small ǫ > 0 (since Fi(x) → 0 as x → 1). The setting
of ǫ needed to achieve truthfulness depends only on how much the players value their preferred candidate
(measured by the left-hand side of Condition 2) and how much they value privacy (measured by the right-
hand side of Condition 2), and is independent of the number of players n.
Proof. Fix the actual type θi ∈ {A, B} of player i, a profile θ−i of reports of the other players, and a choice r for
M’s randomness. The only alternate report for player i we need to consider is θ′i = ¬θi. Let o =M(θi, θ−i; r)
and o′ =M(¬θi, θ−i; r). We need to show that Ui(θi, o,M, θ−i) ≥ Ui(θi, o′,M, θ−i), or equivalently
Uouti (θi, o) − Uouti (θi, o′) ≥ U privi (θi, o′,M, θ−i) − U
priv
i (θi, o,M, θ−i). (4.1)
We consider two cases:
Case 1: o = o′ In this case, Inequality (4.1) holds because both the left-hand and right-hand sides are zero.
Case 2: o , o′ This implies that o = θi and o′ = ¬θi. (If player i’s report has any effect on the outcome of
the differentially private voting mechanism, then it must be that the outcome equals player i’s report.)
Thus the left-hand side of Inequality (4.1) equals Uouti (θi, θi) − Uouti (θi,¬θi). By Proposition 3.3, the
right-hand side of Inequality (4.1) is at most 2F(eǫ ). Thus, Inequality (4.1) holds by hypothesis. 
Of course, truthfulness is not the only property of interest. After all, a mechanism that is simply a
constant function is (weakly) truthful. Another property we would like is economic efficiency. Typically,
this is defined as maximizing social welfare, the sum of players’ utilities. Here we consider the sum of
outcome utilities for simplicity. As is standard, we normalize players’ utilities so that all players are counted
equally in measuring the social welfare. In our voting example, we wish to maximize the number of voters’
whose preferred candidates win, which is equivalent to normalizing the left-hand side of Condition 2 in
Theorem 4.2 to 1. Standard, deterministic majority voting clearly maximizes this measure of social welfare.
Our mechanism achieves approximate efficiency:
Proposition 4.3. For every profile θ ∈ Θn of reports, if we select o ←M(θ) using Mechanism 4.1, then:
1. Pr
[
#{i : θi = o} ≤ maxo′∈{A,B} #{i : θi = o′} − ∆
]
< e−ǫ∆.
2. E [#{i : θi = o}] > maxo′∈{A,B} #{i : θi = o′} − 1/ǫ.
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Proof. The maximum number of voters will be satisfied by taking the majority candidate o∗ = Maj(θ),
where we break ties in favor of A. Let ∆′ = #{i : θi = o∗} − #{i : θi = ¬o∗}. If o∗ = A, then ¬o∗ = B is
selected iff the noise r is larger than ∆′. If o∗ = B, then ¬o∗ = A is selected iff the noise r is smaller than or
equal to −∆′. Since r is chosen so that Pr[r = k] ∝ e−ǫ |k|, the probability of selecting ¬o∗ in either case is
bounded as:
Pr[M(θ) = ¬o∗] ≤
∑
k≥∆′ e−ǫk∑
k∈Z e−ǫ |k|
=
e−ǫ∆
′
1 + e−ǫ
≤ e−ǫ∆′ .
Now the high probability bound follows by considering the case that ∆′ ≥ ∆ (otherwise the event occurs
with probability 0). The expectation bound is computed as follows:
E
[
maxo′∈{A,B} #{i : θi = o′} − #{i : θi =M(θ)}]
= Pr[M(θ) = ¬o∗] · ∆′ ≤ ∆′ · e−ǫ∆
′
1+e−ǫ ≤ 1eǫ · 11+e−ǫ < 1ǫ ,
where the second-to-last inequality follows from the fact that xe−ǫx is minimized at x = 1/ǫ. 
Thus, the number of voters whose preferred candidate wins is within O(1/ǫ) of optimal, in expectation
and with high probability. This deviation is independent of n, the number of players. Thus if we take ǫ to be
a constant (as suffices for truthfulness) and let n → ∞, the economic efficiency approaches optimal, when
we consider both as fractions of n. This also holds for vanishing ǫ = ǫ(n), provided ǫ = ω(1/n). Despite the
notation, ǫ need not be tiny, which allows a tradeoff between efficiency and privacy.
This analysis considers the social welfare as a sum of outcome utilities (again normalizing so that every-
one values their preferred candidate by one unit of utility more than the other candidate). We can consider
the effect of privacy utilities on the social welfare too. By Proposition 3.3, the privacy utilities affect the
social welfare by at most ∑i Fi(eǫ ), assuming player i satisfies Assumption 3.1 with privacy bound function
Fi. If all players satisfy Assumption 3.1 with the same privacy bound function Fi = F, then the effect on
social welfare is at most n · F(eǫ ). By taking ǫ → 0 (e.g., ǫ = 1/√n), the privacy utilities contribute a
vanishing fraction of n.
Another desirable property is individual rationality: players given the additional option of not partici-
pating should still prefer to participate and report truthfully. This property follows from the same argument
we used to establish universal truthfulness. By dropping out, the only change in outcome that player i can
create is to make her less preferred candidate win. Thus, the same argument as in Theorem 4.2 shows that
player i prefers truthful participation to dropping out.
Proposition 4.4. Under the same assumptions as Theorem 4.2, Mechanism 4.1 is individually rational for
player i.
5 Tools for Proving Truthfulness with Privacy
The analysis of truthfulness in Theorem 4.2 is quite general. It holds for any differentially private mech-
anism with the property that if a player can actually change the outcome of the mechanism by reporting
untruthfully, then it will have a noticeable negative impact on the player’s outcome utility. We abstract this
property for use in analyzing our other mechanisms.
Lemma 5.1. Consider a mechanism design problem with n players, type space Θ, and outcome space O.
Let player i have a utility function Ui = Uouti +U privi satisfying Assumption 3.1 with privacy bound function
Fi. Suppose that randomized mechanism M : Θn → O has the following properties:
1. M is ǫ-differentially private, and
2. For all possible types θi, all profiles θ−i of the other players’ reports, all random choices r of M,
and all alternative reports θ′i for player i: if M(θi, θ−i; r) ,M(θ′i , θ−i; r), then Uout(θi,M(θi, θ−i; r)) −
Uout(θi,M(θ′i , θ−i; r)) ≥ 2Fi(eǫ ),
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Then M is universally truthful for player i.
Lemma 5.1 implicitly requires that players not be indifferent between outcomes (unless there is no way
for the player to change one outcome to the other). A condition like this is necessary because otherwise
players may be able to find reports that have no effect on their outcome utility but improve their privacy
utility. However, we show in Section 7 that in some settings with payments, truthfulness can be achieved
even with indifference between outcomes since payments can break ties.
It is also illustrative and useful to consider what happens when we take the expectation over the mecha-
nism’s coin tosses. We can upper-bound the privacy utility as follows:
Lemma 5.2. Consider a mechanism design problem with n players, type space Θ, and outcome space O.
Let player i have type θi ∈ Θi and a utility function Ui = Uouti + U privi satisfying Assumption 3.1. Suppose
that randomized mechanism M : Θn ×R → O is ǫ-differentially private. Then for all possible profiles θ−i of
the other players’ reports, all random choices r of M, and all alternative reports θ′i for player i, we have∣∣∣∣E[U privi (θi,M(θi, θ−i),M, θ−i)] − E[U privi (θi,M(θ′i , θ−i),M, θ−i)]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2Fi(eǫ) · SD(M(θi, θ−i),M(θ′i , θ−i)),
where SD denotes statistical difference.3
Proof. For every two discrete random variables X and Y taking values in a universe U, and every function
f : U → [−1, 1], it holds that |E[ f (X)] − E[ f (Y)]| ≤ 2SD(X, Y). (The f that maximizes the left-hand side
sets f (x) = 1 when Pr[X = x] > Pr[Y = x] and sets f (x) = −1 otherwise.) Take U = O, X = M(θi, θ−i),
Y =M(θ′i , θ−i), and f (o) = U privi (θi, o,M, θ−i)/Fi(eǫ ). By Proposition 3.3, we have f (o) ∈ [−1, 1]. 
By this lemma, to establish truthfulness in expectation, it suffices to show that the expected gain in out-
come utility from reporting θi instead of θ′i grows proportionally with SD(M(θi, θ−i),M(θ′i , θ−i)). (Specifi-
cally, it should be at least the statistical difference times 2Fi(eǫ ).) In Lemma 5.1, the gain in outcome utility
is related to the statistical difference by coupling the random variables M(θi, θ−i) and M(θ′i , θ−i) according
to the random choices r of M. Indeed, Prr[M(θi, θ−i; r) ,M(θ′i , θ−i; r)] ≥ SD(M(θi, θ−i),M(θ′i , θ−i)). Thus,
if the outcome-utility gain from truthfulness is larger than 2Fi(eǫ) whenever M(θi, θ−i; r) , M(θ′i , θ−i; r),
then we have truthfulness in expectation (indeed, even universal truthfulness).
We note that if M is differentially private, then SD(M(θi, θ−i),M(θ′i , θ−i)) ≤ eǫ − 1 = O(ǫ), for small
ǫ. By Lemma 5.2, the expected difference in privacy utility between any two reports is at most O(Fi(eǫ) ·
ǫ). Thus, ǫ-differential privacy helps us twice, once in bounding the pointwise privacy cost (as 2Fi(eǫ )),
and second in bounding the statistical difference between outcomes. On the other hand, for mechanisms
satisfying the conditions of Lemma 5.1, the differential privacy only affects the expected outcome utility by
a factor related to the statistical difference. This is why, by taking ǫ sufficiently small, we can ensure that
the outcome utility of truthfulness dominates the privacy cost.
Lemma 5.2 is related to, indeed inspired by, existing lemmas used to analyze the composition of dif-
ferentially private mechanisms. These lemmas state that while differential privacy guarantees a worst case
bound of ǫ on the “privacy loss” of all possible outputs, this actually implies an expected privacy loss of
O(ǫ2). Such bounds correspond to the special case of Lemma 5.2 when Fi = ln and we replace the statistical
difference with the upper bound eǫ − 1. These O(ǫ2) bounds on expected privacy loss were proven first in
the case of specific mechanisms by Dinur and Nissim [4] and Dwork and Nissim [7], and then in the case of
arbitrary differentially private mechanisms by Dwork et al. [8]. In our case, the O(ǫ2) bound does not suffice,
and we need the stronger bound expressed in terms of the statistical difference. Consider the differentially
private election when the vote is highly skewed (e.g., 2/3 vs. 1/3). Then a player has only an exponentially
3The statistical difference (aka total variation distance) between two discrete random variables X and Y taking values in a
universe U is defined to be SD(X,Y) = maxS⊆U |Pr[X ∈ S ] − Pr[Y ∈ S ]|.
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small probability (over the random choice r of the mechanism) of affecting the outcome, and so the expected
outcome utility for voting truthfully is exponentially small. On the other hand, by Lemma 5.2, the expected
privacy loss is also exponentially small, so we can still have truthfulness.
6 Discrete Facility Location
In this section, we apply our framework to discrete facility location. Let Θ = {ℓ1 < ℓ2 < · · · < ℓq} ⊂ [0, 1] be
a finite set of types indicating player’s preferred locations for a facility on the unit interval and O = [0, 1].
Players prefer to have the facility located as close to them as possible: Uouti (θi, o) = −|θi − o|. For example,
the mechanism may be selecting a location for a bus stop along a major highway, and the locations ℓ1, . . . , ℓq
might correspond to cities along the highway where potential bus riders live.
Note that the voting game we previously considered can be represented as the special case where
Θ = {0, 1}. This problem has a well-known truthful and economically efficient mechanism: select the loca-
tion of the median report. Xiao [19] gave a private and truthful mechanism for this problem based on taking
the median of a perturbed histogram. His analysis only proved that the mechanism satisfies “approximate
differential privacy” (often called (ǫ, δ) differential privacy). To use Proposition 3.3, we need the mechanism
to satisfy pure ǫ differential privacy (as in Definition 3.2). Here we do that for a variant of Xiao’s mechanism.
Mechanism 6.1. Differentially private discrete facility location mechanism
Input: profile θ ∈ Θn of types, privacy parameter ǫ > 0.
1. Construct the histogram h = (h1, . . . , hq) of reported type frequencies where h j is the number of
reports θi of type ℓ j and q = |Θ|.
2. Choose a random (nonnegative, integer) noise vector r = (r1, . . . , rq) ∈ Nq where the components r j
are chosen independently such that Pr
[
r j = k
]
is proportional to exp(−ǫk/2).
3. Output the type corresponding to median of the perturbed histogram h+r. That is, we output ℓMed(h+r),
where for z ∈ Nq we define Med(z) to be the minimum k ∈ [q] such that ∑kj=1 z j ≥ ∑qj=k+1 z j).
Xiao’s mechanism instead chooses the noise components r j according to a truncated and shifted Laplace
distribution. Specifically, Pr[r j = k] is proportional to exp((ǫ/2) · |k − t|) for k = 0, . . . , 2t and Pr[r j = k] = 0
for k > 2t, where t = Θ(log(1/δ)/ǫ). This ensures that the noisy histogram h + r is (ǫ, qδ) differentially
private, and hence the outcome ℓMed(h+r) is as well. Our proof directly analyzes the median, without pass-
ing through the histogram. This enables us to achieve pure ǫ differential privacy and use a simpler noise
distribution. On the other hand, Xiao’s analysis is more general, in that it applies to any mechanism that
computes its result based on a noisy histogram.
Lemma 6.2. Mechanism 6.1 is ǫ-differentially private.
Proof. Differential privacy requires that on any pair of histograms h, h′ reachable by one player reporting
different types, the probability of any particular outcome o = ℓ j being selected differs by at most an eǫ
multiplicative factor. Since reporting a different type results in two changes to the histogram (adding to one
type and subtracting from another), we show that on each such change the probability differs by at most an
eǫ/2 factor.
Consider two histograms h and h′ that differ only by an addition or subtraction of 1 to a single entry. Let
f j : Nq → Nq map a vector s to the vector (s j + 1, s− j) (i.e., identical except s j has been increased by 1). f j
is an injection and has the property that if j is the median of h + s then j is also the median of h′ + f j(s).
Note that under our noise distribution, we have Pr[r = s] = eǫ/2 · Pr[r = f j(s)].
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Then writing M as a function of h rather than θ, we have:
Pr
[
M(h) = ℓ j
]
=
∑
s s.t. Med(h+s)= j
Pr [r = s]
=
∑
s s.t. Med(h+s)= j
eǫ/2 · Pr
[
r = f j(s)
]
≤ eǫ/2 ·
∑
s s.t. Med(h′+ f j(s))= j
Pr
[
r = f j(s)
]
≤ eǫ/2
∑
s′ s.t. Med(h′+s′)= j
Pr
[
r = s′
]
= eǫ/2 · Pr
[
M(h′) = ℓ j
]
.
A symmetric argument shows this is also true switching h and h′, which completes the proof. 
We note that the only property the proof uses about the noise distribution is that Pr[r = s] = eǫ/2 · Pr[r =
f j(s)]. This property does not hold for Xiao’s noise distribution as described, due to it being truncated above
at 2t, but would hold if his noise distribution was truncated only below.
We next show that this mechanism is truthful and individually rational.
Theorem 6.3. Mechanism 6.1 is universally truthful and individually rational for player i provided that, for
some function Fi:
1. Player i’s privacy utility U privi satisfies Assumption 3.1 with privacy bound function Fi, and
2. For all o, o′ ∈ Θ such that θi < o < o′ or o′ > o > θi, we have Uouti (θi, o) − Uouti (θi, o′) ≥ 2Fi(eǫ ).
In particular, if all players share the standard outcome utility function Uouti (θi, o) = −|θi − o| and have the
same privacy bound function Fi = F, then the mechanism is universally truthful and individually rational
provided that
min
j,k
|ℓ j − ℓk | ≥ 2F(eǫ ).
So, for a fixed set Θ of player types (preferred locations), we can take ǫ to be a small constant and have
truthfulness and individual rationality.
Proof. Fix r ∈ Nq, the randomness used by the mechanism and the reports θ−i of other players. Follow-
ing Xiao [19], we think of r as representing the reports of some fictional additional players, and follow
the truthfulness reasoning for the standard, noiseless median mechanism. Suppose M(θi, θ−i; r) = o and
M(θ′i , θ−i; r) = o′ , o. If θi < o, then no other report of player i can reduce the median, so we must have
o′ > o. Thus, this change has moved the facility at least one location away from i’s preferred location.
Similarly, if θi > o, we have o′ < o so again the change is away from i’s preferred location. Therefore,
universal truthfulness follows by Lemma 5.1. For individual rationality, we can model non-participation as
a report of a type ⊥ that does not get included in the histogram. Again, any change of of the median caused
by reporting ⊥ will move it away from i’s preferred location. Thus M is individually rational. 
Proposition 6.4. Suppose that every player i has the standard outcome utility function Uouti (θi, o) = −|θi−o|.
Then for every profile of types θ ∈ Θn, if we choose o ←M(θ) using Mechanism 6.1, we have
1. Pr
[∑
i Uouti (θi, o) ≤ maxo′
(∑
i Uouti (θi, o′)
)
− ∆
]
≤ q · e−ǫ∆/q.
2. E
[∑
i Uouti (θi, o)
]
≥ maxo′
(∑
i Uouti (θi, o′)
)
− O(q/ǫ).
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Thus, the social welfare is within ∆ = ˜O(q)/ǫ of optimal, both in expectation and with high probability.
Like with Proposition 4.3, these bounds are independent of the number n of participants, so we obtain
asymptotically optimal social welfare as n → ∞. Also like the discussion after Proposition 4.3, by taking
ǫ = ǫ(n) to be such that ǫ = o(1) and ǫ = ω(1/n) (e.g., ǫ = 1/√n), the sum of privacy utilities is a vanishing
fraction of n (for participants satisfying Assumption 3.1 with a common privacy bound function F).
Proof. Note that −∑i Uouti (θi, o′) = ∑ j h j · |ℓ j−o′|, where h = (h1, . . . , hq) is the histogram corresponding to
θ. This social welfare is minimized by taking o′ = Med(h). Our mechanism, however, computes the optimal
location for the noisy histogram h + r. We can relate the two as follows:
−
∑
i
Uouti (θi, o) =
∑
j
h j · |ℓ j − o|
≤
∑
j
(h j + r j) · |ℓ j − o|
= min
o′
∑
j
(h j + r j) · |ℓ j − o′|
≤ min
o′
∑
j
h j · |ℓ j − o′| +
∑
j
r j
= −max
o′
∑
i
Uouti (θi, o′) +
∑
j
r j.
Thus, for the high probability bound, it suffices to bound the probability that
∑
j r j ≥ ∆. This in turn is
bounded by q times the probability that any particular r j is at least ∆/q, which is at most e−ǫ∆/q. For the
expectation bound, we have
E[
∑
j
r j] =
∑
j
E[r j] = q ·
1
1 − e−ǫ/2 = O
(q
ǫ
)
.

7 General Social Choice Problems With Payments
In the preceding two sections we have considered social choice problems where a group needs to choose
among a (typically small) set of options with mechanisms that do not use money. In this section, we apply
our framework social choice problems where payments are possible using an adaptation of the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. (This is the setting for which the Groves mechanism was originally
designed and unlike in auction settings the number of outcomes is independent of the number of players.)
In the general case we examine now, we don’t assume any structure on the utility functions (other than
discreteness), and thus need to use payments to incentivize players to truthfully reveal their preferences.
Specifically, the type θi ∈ Θ of a player will specify a utility Uout(θi, o) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , M} for each outcome
o from a finite set O. This could correspond, for example, to players having values for outcomes expressible
in whole dollars with some upper and lower bounds. This assumption ensures a finite set of types Θ and
that if a player changes his reported value it must change by some minimum amount (1 with our particular
assumption). Note that this formulation still allows players to be indifferent among outcomes. Gicen our
notion of a type, all players share the same outcome utility function Uouti = U
out In order to reason about
individual rationality, we also assume that the set of types includes a type ⊥ that corresponds to not partici-
pating (i.e., Uouti (⊥, o) = 0 for all o and i). For notational convenience, we assume that O = {0, 1, . . . , |O|−1}.
Our goal is to choose the outcome o∗ that maximizes social welfare (ignoring privacy), i.e., o∗ =
argmaxo∈O
∑
i Uout(θi, o). A standard way to do so is the Groves mechanism, a special case of the more
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general VCG mechanism. Each player reports his type and then the optimal outcome o∗ is chosen based on
the reported types. To ensure truthfulness, each player is charged the externality he imposes on others. If
o−i = argmaxo
∑
j,i Uout(θ j, o) is the outcome that would have been chosen without i’s input, then player i
makes a payment of
Pi =
∑
j,i
(
Uout(θ j, o−i) − Uout(θ j, o∗)
)
, (7.1)
for a combined utility of Uout(θi, o∗) − Pi.
In addition to subtracting payments from player i’s utility as above, we also need to consider the effect of
payments on privacy. (The modelling in Section 3 did not consider payments.) While it may be reasonable
to treat the payments players make as secret, so that making the payment does not reveal information to
others, the amount a player is asked to pay reveals information about the reports of other players. Therefore,
we will require that the mechanism releases some public payment information π that enables all players to
compute their payments, i.e., the payment Pi of player i should be a function of θi, π, and o∗. For example,
π could just be the n-tuple (P1, . . . , Pn), which corresponds to making all payments public. But in the VCG
mechanism it suffices for π to include the value Vo =
∑
i Uout(θi, o) for all outcomes o ∈ O, since
Pi = (Vo−i − Uout(θi, o−i)) − (Vo∗ − Uout(θi, o∗)) = maxo
(
(Uout(θi, o∗) − Uout(θi, o)) − (Vo∗ − Vo)
)
,
which can be computed using just the Vo’s, o∗, and θi. Moreover, we actually only need to release the
differences Vo∗ − Vo, and only need to do so for outcomes o such that Vo∗ − Vo ≤ M, since only such
outcomes have a chance of achieving the above maximum. (Recall that Uout(θi, o) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , M}.) This
observation forms the basis of our mechanism, which we will show to be truthful for players that value
privacy (under Assumption 3.1).
Before stating our mechanism, we summarize how we take payments into account in our modelling.
Given reports θ′ ∈ Θn and randomness r, our mechanism M(θ′; r) outputs a pair (o∗, π), where o∗ ∈ O is the
selected outcome and π is “payment information”. Each player then should send payment Pi = P(θ′i , o∗, π)
to the mechanism. (The payment function P is something we design together with the mechanism M.) If
player i’s true type is θi, then her total utility is:
Ui(θi, o∗, π,M, θ′) = Uout(θi, o∗) − P(θ′i , o∗, π) + U privi (θi, (o∗, π),M, θ′−i).
Note that we measure the privacy of the pair (o∗, π), since both are released publicly.
To achieve truthfulness for players that value privacy, we will modify the VCG mechanism described
above by adding noise to the values Vo. This yields the following mechanism:
Mechanism 7.1. Differentially private VCG mechanism
Input: profile θ ∈ Θn of types, privacy parameter ǫ > 0.
1. Choose λo from a (discrete) Laplace distribution for each outcome o. Specifically, we set Pr[λo =
k] ∝ exp(−(ǫ · |k|)/(M · |O|)) for every integer k ∈ Z.
2. Calculate values Vo =
∑
j Uout(θ j, o) + λo + o/|O| for each outcome o. (Recall that we set O =
{0, . . . , |O| − 1}. The o/|O| term is introduced in order to break ties.)
3. Select outcome o∗ = arg maxo Vo.
4. Set the payment information π = {(o,Vo∗ − Vo) : Vo ≥ Vo∗ − M}.
5. Output (o∗, π).
Each player i then sends a payment of Pi = P(θi, o∗, π) = maxo ((Uout(θi, o∗) − Uout(θi, o)) − (Vo∗ − Vo)) .
By standard results on differential privacy, the tuple of noisy values {Vo} is ǫ-differentially private. Since
the output (o∗, π) is a function of the Vo’s, the output is also differentially private:
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Lemma 7.2. Mechanism 7.1 is ǫ-differentially private.
We now prove that the mechanism is truthful in expectation for players that value privacy (satisfying
Assumption 3.1). To do this, we use Lemma 5.2, which shows that by taking ǫ sufficiently small, the
expected change in privacy utility from misreporting θ′i instead of θi can be made an arbitrarily small fraction
of the statistical difference SD(M(θi, θ−i),M(θ′i , θ−i)). Thus, to show truthfulness in expectation, it suffices
to show that the statistical difference is at most a constant factor larger than the expected decrease in utility
from misreporting. That is, we want to show:
SD(M(θi, θ−i),M(θ′i , θ−i))
= O
(
E[Uout(θi,M(θi, θ−i)) − P(θi,M(θi, θ−i))] − E[Uout(θi,M(θ′i , θ−i)) − P(θ′i ,M(θ′i , θ−i))]
)
.
To bound the statistical difference, we write M(θ; r) = (M1(θ; r),M2(θ; r)), where M1 gives the out-
come o∗ and M2 gives the payment information π. Then we have:
SD(M(θi, θ−i),M(θ′i , θ−i)) ≤ Prr [M(θi, θ−i; r) ,M(θ
′
i , θ−i; r)] ≤ Prr [M
1(θi, θ−i; r) ,M1(θ′i , θ−i; r)]
+ Pr
r
[M1(θi, θ−i; r) =M1(θ′i , θ−i; r) ∧M2(θi, θ−i; r) ,M2(θ′i , θ−i; r)].
The next lemma bounds the statistical difference coming from the outcome:
Lemma 7.3.
Pr
r
[M1(θi, θ−i; r) ,M1(θ′i , θ−i; r)] ≤ |O| · (E[Uout(θi,M1(θi, θ−i)) − P(θi,M(θi, θ−i))]
−E[Uout(θi,M1(θ′i , θ−i)) − P(θ′i ,M(θi, θ−i))]).
Proof. It suffices to show that for every value of r, we have:
I[M1(θi, θ−i; r) ,M1(θ′i , θ−i; r)] ≤ |O| · (Uout(θi,M1(θi, θ−i; r)) − P(θi,M(θi, θ−i; r)) (7.2)
− Uout(θi,M1(θ′i , θ−i; r)) − P(θ′i ,M(θi, θ−i; r))),
where I[X] denotes the indicator for the event X. (Then taking expectation over r yields the desired result.)
If M1(θi, θ−i; r) = M1(θ′i , θ−i; r), then both the left-hand and right-hand sides are zero. (Recall that
the payment made by player i on an outcome o depends only on the reports of the other players and the
randomness of the mechanism.)
So consider a value of r such that M1(θi, θ−i; r) ,M1(θ′i , θ−i; r) (i.e., where the indicator is 1). We can
treat the λo + o/|O| term added to each Vo as the report of another player to the standard VCG mechanism.
We know that
Uout(θi,M1(θi, θ−i; r)) − P(θi,M(θi, θ−i; r)) − Uout(θi,M(θ′i , θ−i; r)) − P(θ′i ,M(θi, θ−i; r)) ≥ 0
because VCG is incentive compatible for players who don’t have a privacy utility. Since the mechanism
adds an o/|O| term to Vo to avoid ties, the above inequality is strict. Moreover, the left-hand side is at least
1/|O|, which establishes Inequality (7.2).
In more detail, let o∗ =M1(θi, θ−i; r) and o′ =M1(θ′i , θ−i; r) for some o′ , o∗. Write Wo =
∑
j,i Uoutj (θ j, o)+
λo + o/|O| for each outcome o (Wo is just Vo excluding the report of player i), and o−i = argmaxo Wo. Since
the mechanism chose o∗ on report θi, we must have
Wo∗ + Uout(θi, o∗) ≥ Wo′ + Uout(θi, o′).
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Since the fractional parts of the two sides are different multiples of 1/|O| (namely o∗/|O| ad o′/|O|), we have:
Wo∗ + Uout(θi, o∗) ≥ Wo′ + Uout(θi, o′) + 1/|O|.
Thus:
Uout(θi,M1(θi, θ−i; r)) − P(θi,M(θi, θ−i; r))
= Uout(θi, o∗) − (Wo−i − Wo∗)
≥ Uout(θi, o′) − (Wo−i − Wo′) + 1/|O|
= Uout(θi,M(θ′i , θ−i; r)) − P(θ′i ,M(θi, θ−i; r)) + 1/|O|,
establishing Inequality (7.2). 
Now we need to prove a similar bound for the probability of misreporting only affecting the payment
information π. We note that one trivial solution for handling payments is to only collect payments with a very
small probability p, but increase the magnitude of the payments by a factor of 1/p. In order for payments
to not contribute more to the statistical difference than the outcome, we can take p to be the minimum
possible nonzero value of the probability that a misreport can change the outcome (i.e., Prr[M1(θi, θ−i; r) ,
M1(θ′i , θ−i; r)]). However, this quantity is exponentially small in n. This would make the magnitude of
payments exponentially large, which is undesirable. (Our assumption that players are risk neutral seems
unreasonable in such a setting.) However, it turns out that we do not actually need to do this; our mechanism
already releases payment information with sufficiently low probability. Indeed, we only release payment
information relating to an outcome o when Vo is within M of Vo∗ , and the probability that this occurs cannot
be much larger than the probability that the outcome is changed from o∗ to o.
Lemma 7.4.
Pr
r
[M1(θi, θ−i; r) =M1(θ′i , θ−i; r) ∧M2(θi, θ−i; r) ,M2(θ′i , θ−i; r)]
≤ 2Meǫ/|O| · Pr
r
[M1(θi, θ−i; r) ,M1(θ′i , θ−i; r)].
Proof. First observe that
Pr
r
[M1(θi, θ−i; r) =M1(θ′i , θ−i; r) ∧M2(θi, θ−i; r) ,M2(θ′i , θ−i; r)]
≤
∑
o1,o2
Pr
r
[M1(θi, θ−i; r) =M1(θ′i , θ−i; r) = o1 ∧M2(θi, θ−i; r) ,M2(θ′i , θ−i; r) on o2],
by which we mean that either (o2,Vo1 − Vo2) is released in one case but not the other or it is released in both
cases but with different values.
Fix o1 and o2 as above. If Uout(θi, o1)−Uout(θi, o2) = Uout(θ′i , o1)−Uout(θ′i , o2), then Prr[M1(θi, θ−i; r) =
M1(θ′i , θ−i; r) = o1∧M2(θi, θ−i; r) ,M2(θ′i , θ−i; r) on o2] = 0 because the difference between Vo1 and Vo2 is
not changed by the misreporting. So assume that Uout(θi, o1)−Uout(θi, o2) , Uout(θ′i , o1)−Uout(θ′i , o2); these
values must differ by at least 1 due to the discreteness assumption. Fix λo = ko for o , o2. Denote them as
a vector λ−o2 = k−o2 . Consider some value ko2 such that when λo2 = ko2 we have M1(θi, θ−i; (ko2 , k−o2)) =
M1(θ′i , θ−i; (ko2 , k−o2 )) = o1 and M2(θi, θ−i; (ko2 , k−o2 )) , M2(θ′i , θ−i; (ko2 , k−o2 )) on o2. (If there is no such
ko2 then the event has probability 0 for this choice of k−o2 .) Now consider increasing the value of λo2 . Let
ˆko2 be the minimum value such that either M1(θi, θ−i; (ˆko2 , k−o2 )) = o2 or M1(θ′i , θ−i; (ˆko2 , k−o2 )) = o2. At
the first such value of ˆko2 , only one of these two events will happen because Uout(θi, o1) − Uout(θi, o2) and
Uout(θ′i , o1) − Uout(θ′i , o2) differ by at least 1. Moreover, we have ˆko2 ≤ ko2 + M because with λo2 = ko2
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we have Vo1 − Vo2 ≤ M for either report θi or θ′i . Since Pr[λo2 = k] ∝ exp(−ǫ · |k|/(M · |O|)), we have
Pr[λo2 = ko2 ] ≤ exp(ǫ/|O|) · Pr[λo2 = ˆko2 ]. Furthermore, there can be at most M such values of ko2 . Thus,
Pr
r
[λ−o2 = k−o2 ∧M1(θi, θ−i; r) =M1(θ′i , θ−i; r) = o1 ∧M2(θi, θ−i; r) ,M2(θ′i , θ−i; r) on o2]
≤ Meǫ/|O| Pr
r
[λ−o2 = k−o2 ∧M1(θi, θ−i; r) ,M1(θ′i , θ−i; r) ∧M1(θi, θ−i; r) ∈ {o1, o2}
∧M1(θ′i , θ−i; r) ∈ {o1, o2}]
Summing over all o1 , o2 and k−o2 gives us the lemma. The factor 2 in the lemma statement is due to the
fact that∑
o1,o2 ,ko2
Pr
r
[λ−o2 = k−o2 ∧M1(θi, θ−i; r) ,M1(θ′i , θ−i; r) ∧M1(θi, θ−i; r) ∈ {o1, o2} ∧M1(θ′i , θ−i; r) ∈ {o1, o2}]
= 2 Pr
r
[M1(θi, θ−i; r) ,M1(θ′i , θ−i; r)].

Combining Lemmas 7.3 and 7.4, we have
SD(M(θi, θ−i),M(θ′i , θ−i)) ≤ |O| · (1 + 2Meǫ/|O|) · (E[Uout(θi,M1(θi, θ−i)) − P(θi,M(θi, θ−i))]
− E[Uout(θi,M1(θ′i , θ−i)) − P(θ′i ,M(θi, θ−i))]).
Applying Lemma 5.2 gives us our theorem.
Theorem 7.5. Mechanism 7.1 is truthful in expectation and individually rational for player i provided that,
for some function Fi:
1. Player i’s privacy utility U privi satisfies Assumption 3.1 with privacy bound function Fi, and
2. 2Fi(eǫ ) · |O| · (1 + 2Meǫ/|O|) ≤ 1.
In particular, if all players have the same privacy bound function Fi = F, it suffices to take ǫ to be a
sufficiently small constant depending only on M and |O| (and not the number n of players).
Truthfulness in expectation relies on players being risk neutral in terms of their privacy utility so that it
is acceptable that with some low probability, the privacy costs are larger than their utility from the outcome.
An alternative approach that does not rely on risk neutrality is to switch from the VCG mechanism to the
Expected Externality mechanism. This is a variant on VCG that, rather than charging players the actual
externality they impose as in Equation (7.1), charges them their expected externality
Eθ∼p

∑
j,i
Uout(θ j, o−i) − Uout(θ j, o∗)
 , (7.3)
where p is a prior distribution over Θn, o−i is the outcome that maximizes the sum of outcome utilities of
players other than i, and o∗ is the outcome that maximizes the sum of outcome utilities when i is included.
Essentially, i is charged the expected amount he would have to pay under VCG given the prior over types.
Since the amount players are charged is independent of the actual reports of others, collecting payments
has no privacy implications. (The proof of Lemma 7.3 shows that if we only consider the privacy cost of
the outcome, then we have universal truthfulness.) However, the use of a prior means that the truthfulness
guarantee only holds in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, this mechanism does have other nice
properties such as being adaptable to guarantee budget balance.
Finally, we show that Mechanism 7.1 approximately preserves VCG’s efficiency.
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Proposition 7.6. For every profile of types θ ∈ Θn, if we choose o ← M(θ) using Mechanism 7.1, then we
have:
1. Pr
[∑
i Uouti (θi, o) < maxo′
(∑
i Uouti (θi, o′)
)
− ∆
]
≤ 2|O| · e−ǫ∆/(2M·|O|),
2. E
[∑
i Uouti (θi, o)
]
≥ maxo′
(∑
i Uouti (θi, o′)
)
− O(|O|2 · M/ǫ).
Proof. Let o∗∗ = argmaxo Uoutj (θ j, o). For the output o∗ of Mechanism 7.1, we have:
∑
j
Uoutj (θ j, o∗) = Vo∗ − λo∗ − o∗/|O|
≥ Vo∗∗ − λo∗ − o∗/|O|
=
(
max
o
Uoutj (θ j, o)
)
+ λo∗∗ + o
∗∗/|O| − λo∗ − o∗/|O|
>
(
max
o
Uoutj (θ j, o)
)
− max
o
(λo − λo∗∗ ) − 1.
So we are left with bounding maxo(λo−λo∗∗) for random variables λo such that Pr[λo = k] ∝ exp(−ǫ · |k|/(M ·
|O|)). For each o,
Pr[λo − λo∗∗ ≥ ∆] ≤ Pr[λo ≥ ∆/2] + Pr[λo∗∗ ≤ −∆/2] ≤ 2 exp(−ǫ∆/(2M · |O|)).
Taking a union bound over the choices for o completes the high probability bound. For the expectation, we
have:
E[max
o
(λo − λo∗∗ )] ≤ E

∑
o
|λo|
 = |O| · O (M · |O|/ǫ) .

Thus, the social welfare is within ˜O(|O|2) ·M/ǫ of optimal, both in expectation and with high probability.
Like with Proposition 4.3, these bounds are independent of the number n of participants, so we obtain
asymptotically optimal social welfare as n → ∞. Also like the discussion after Proposition 4.3, by taking
ǫ = ǫ(n) to be such that ǫ = o(1) and ǫ = ω(1/n) (e.g., ǫ = 1/√n), the sum of privacy utilities is also a
vanishing fraction of n (for participants satisfying Assumption 3.1 with a common privacy bound function
F).
8 Discussion
We conclude by discussing a Bayesian interpretation of our privacy model and several of the model’s limi-
tations.
Our modelling of privacy in Section 3 is motivated in part by viewing privacy as a concern about other’s
beliefs about you. Fix a randomized mechanism M : Θn × R → O, a player i ∈ [n], and a profile θ−i ∈ Θn−1
of other player’s reports. Suppose that an adversary has a prior Ti on the type of player i, as well as a prior
S i on the strategy σ : Θ → Θ played by player i. Then upon seeing an outcome o from the mechanism, the
adversary should replace Ti with a posterior T ′i computed according to Bayes’ Rule as follows:
Pr[T ′i = θi] = Pr[Ti = θi|M(S i(Ti), θ−i) = o]
= Pr[Ti = θi] ·
Pr[M(S i(Ti), θ−i) = o|Ti = θi]
Pr[M(S i(Ti), θ−i) = o] .
Thus if we set x = maxθ′,θ′′∈Θ(Pr [M(θ′, θ−i) = o] /Pr [M(θ′′, θ−i) = o]) (the argument of Fi in Assump-
tion 3.1), then we have
x−1 · Pr[Ti = θi] ≤ Pr[T ′i = θi] ≤ x · Pr[Ti = θi].
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So if x is close to 1, then the posterior T ′i is close to the prior Ti, having the same probability mass functions
within a factor of x, and consequently having statistical difference at most x − 1. Thus, Assumption 3.1
can be justified by asserting that “if an adversary’s beliefs about player i do not change much, then it has a
minimal impact on player i’s privacy utility.” One way to think of this is that player i has some smooth value
function of the adversary’s beliefs about her, and her privacy utility is the difference of the value function
after and before the Bayesian updating. This reasoning follows the lines of Bayesian interpretations of
differential privacy due to Dwork and McSherry, and described in [13].
This Bayesian modelling also explains why we do not include the strategy played by i in the privacy
utility function U privi . How a Bayesian adversary updates its beliefs about player i based on the outcome
do not depend on the actual strategy played by i, but rather on the adversary’s beliefs about that strategy,
denoted by S i in the above discussion. Given that our mechanisms are truthful, it is most natural to consider
S i as the truthful strategy (i.e., the identity function). If the Bayesian adversary values possessing a correct
belief about players, this is analogous to a notion of equilibrium. If we treat the adversary as another player
then if the players report truthfully and the adversary assumes the players report truthfully each is responding
optimally to the other. However, if player i can successfully convince the adversary that she will follow some
other strategy S i, then this can be implicitly taken into account in U privi . (But if player i further deviates
from S i, this should not be taken into account, since the adversary’s beliefs will be updated according to S i.)
Our modelling of privacy in terms of other’s beliefs is subject to several (reasonable) critiques:
• Sometimes a small, continuous change in beliefs can result in discrete choices that have a large impact
in someone’s life. For example, consider a ranking of potential employees to hire, students to admit, or
suitors to marry—a small change in beliefs about a candidate may cause them to drop one place in a
ranking, and thereby not get hired, admitted, or married. On the other hand, the candidate typically does
not know exactly where such a threshold is and so from their perspective the small change in beliefs
could be viewed as causing a small change in the probability of rejection.
• Like in differential privacy, we only consider an adversary’s beliefs about player i given the rest of the
database. (This is implicit in us considering a fixed θ−i in Assumption 3.1.) If an adversary believes that
player i’s type is correlated with the other players (e.g., given by a joint prior T onΘn), then conditioning
on T−i = θ−i may already dramatically change the adversary’s beliefs about player i. For example, if
the adversary knew that all n voters in a given precinct prefer the same candidate (but don’t know which
candidate that is), then conditioning on θ−i tells the adversary who player i prefers. We don’t measure
the (dis)utility for leaking this kind of information. Indeed, the differentially private election mechanism
of Theorem 4.2 will leak the preferred candidate in this example (with high probability).
• The word “privacy” is used in many other ways. Instead of being concerned about other’s beliefs, one
may be concerned about self-representation (e.g., the effect that reporting a given type may have on
one’s self-image).
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A Comparison to Xiao’s Privacy Measure4
Xiao [19] measures privacy cost as being proportional to the mutual information between a player’s type
and the outcome of the mechanism, where the mutual information between two jointly distributed random
4Subsequent to our work, Xiao has revised his model to use a different, prior-free measure of privacy. This appendix provides a
comparison to his original formulation.
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variables X and Y is defined to be
I(X; Y) = H(X) + H(Y) − H(X, Y) = E
(x,y)∼(X,Y)
[
log Pr[(X, Y) = (x, y)]
Pr[X = x] · Pr[Y = y]
]
,
where H(Z) = Ez∼Z[log(1/Pr[Z = z])] is Shannon entropy. In order for the mutual information to make
sense, Xiao assumes a prior Ti on a player’s type and the privacy cost also depends on the strategy σi : Θ→
Θ played by player i. Accordingly his measure of outcome utility also takes an expectation over the same
prior Ti, resulting in the following definition.
Definition A.1. Let Θ be a type space, O an outcome space, Uout : Θ ×O → R an outcome-utility function,
and let νi ≥ 0 be a measure of player i’s value for privacy, and let Ti be a prior on player i’s type. Then a
randomized mechanism M : Θn × R → O is Xiao-truthful for player i if for all strategies σi : Θ → Θ, and
all profiles θ−i of reports for the other players, we have:
E[Uout(Ti,M(Ti, θ−i))] − νi · I(Ti;M(Ti, θ−i)) ≥ E[Uout(Ti,M(σi(Ti), θ−i))] − νi · I(Ti;M(σi(Ti), θ−i)),
where the expectations and mutual information are taken both over Ti and the random choices of M.
While mutual information is a natural first choice for measuring privacy, it has several disadvantages
compared to our modelling:
• It treats all bits of information the same, whereas clearly one may have different concerns for different
aspects of one’s private type. For example, one may be a lot more sensitive about the high-order bits
of one’s salary than the low-order bits.
• It forces us to consider a prior on a player’s type and take expected utility over that prior. Contrast
this with the Bayesian interpretation of our privacy modelling described in Section 8. There the prior
Ti is only an adversary’s beliefs about player i’s type, which may be completely incorrect. Player i’s
utility is computed with respect to his fixed, actual type θi.
As mentioned earlier, Xiao’s modelling is not a special case of ours, particularly because his modelling
of privacy depends on the actual strategy σi followed by player i. Nevertheless, we can show that truthfulness
with respect to our definitions implies truthfulness with respect to his:
Theorem A.2. If M is truthful in expectation for player i with respect to the privacy utility function
U privi (θi, o,M, θ−i) = −νi · log
Pr[M(θi, θ−i) = o]
Pr[M(Ti, θ−i) = o] ,
then M is Xiao-truthful for player i with prior Ti.
We note that the privacy utility function in Theorem A.2 satisfies Assumption 3.1 with Fi(x) = νi ·log(x),
and hence all of our truthful mechanisms are also Xiao-truthful.
Proof. First note that, by Bayes’ Rule,
U privi (θi, o,M, θ−i) = −νi · log
Pr[M(Ti, θ−i) = o|Ti = θi]
Pr[M(Ti, θ−i) = o] = −νi · log
Pr[(Ti,M(Ti, θ−i)) = (θi, o)]
Pr[Ti = θi] · Pr[M(Ti, θ−i) = o] . (A.1)
Thus,
− νi · I(Ti;M(Ti, θ−i)) = E
[
U privi (Ti,M(Ti, θ−i),M, θ−i)
]
. (A.2)
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To relate the mutual information under strategy σi to U privi , we use the notion of KL divergence between
two random variables X and Y , which is defined as
KL(X||Y) = E
x∼X
[
log Pr[X = x]
Pr[Y = y]
]
.
We will use the fact that for a random variable W jointly distributed with X and Y , we have KL(W, X||W, Y) ≥
KL(X||Y). (This follows from the Log-Sum Inequality [3].) Taking W = Ti, X = M(σi(Ti), θ−i), and
Y =M(Ti, θ−i), we have
I(Ti;M(σi(Ti), θ−i))
≥ I(Ti;M(σi(Ti), θ−i)) − KL(Ti,M(σi(Ti))||Ti,M(Ti)) + KL(M(σi(Ti))||M(Ti))
= E
(θi ,o)∼(Ti,M(σi(Ti),θ−i))
[
log Pr[(Ti,M(Ti, θ−i)) = (θi, o)]
Pr[Ti = θi] · Pr[M(Ti, θ−i) = o]
]
.
Combining this with Equation (A.1), we have:
− νi · I(Ti;M(σi(Ti), θ−i)) ≤ E
[
U privi (Ti, o,M(σi(Ti), θ−i)
]
. (A.3)
By truthfulness in expectation with respect to U privi , we have
E[Uout(Ti,M(Ti, θ−i))] + E
[
U privi (Ti,M(Ti, θ−i),M, θ−i)
]
(A.4)
≥ E[Uout(Ti,M(σi(Ti), θ−i))] + E
[
U privi (Ti, o,M(σi(Ti), θ−i, θ−i)
]
Combining Inequalities (A.2), (A.3), and (A.4) completes the proof. 
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